Abstract
Introduction
Section 22 of the Australian Consumer Law provide as follows:
(1)A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with:
(a) the supply or possible supply of goods or services to another person (other than a listed public company); or (b) the acquisition or possible acquisition of goods or services from another person (other than a listed public company); engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable. . 1 The initial equivalent to this provision, first inserted more than a decade ago 2 was designed to address and overcome the advantages provided to those with super bargaining strength, particularly property owners in relation to shopping centre tenants and franchisors and their bond to franchisees. 3 In essence, it articulates a norm of conduct, with a recognised purpose of protecting the small business consumer, 4 relief available even though loss may be minimal. 5 Unlike s 20, and more expansively than s 21, a non-exhaustive list of factors 6 is provided to assist the court in determining whether the conduct is unconscionable, this 'principled discretion' 7 alleviating the legal professions conservative fear of unbridled judicial subjectivity and creativity. With judges to date defining unconscionability by way of recourse to dictionary definitions with generically unhelpful statements such as '"very unfair", "very unreasonable", "against conscience", or "moral obloquy" being the determinants of unconscionable conduct in the commercial setting ', 8 in use, 9 the section has oft been criticised, 10 rarely successful 11 and the subject of much academic musing. 12 However, the purpose of this debate is not to traverse the limiting judicial pronouncements or the commentary on the legislative deficiencies -this already done more than adequately. 13 Its intent is primarily to consider the primary judge and the Full Federal Court decision in Allphones Retail Pty
Ltd v Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd, 14 and to ask which of the four judges that heard the matter correctly interpreted the connection and relationship between s 22 (the normative standard) with s 243 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (see also s 87 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010) (its remedial conclusion) and requirement with this latter section that to recover, the loss or damage must be caused by the unconscionable conduct. 15 It is respectfully suggested that it was the unique circumstances of this case that led the High Court to reject special leave to appeal but that they should a similar manner be reheard again, the error evident in the majority judgement in Allphones will, or at least should, be overturned. The conclusion is that the full Federal Court majority judgement of Goldberg and Jacobson JJ unnecessarily and severely limited the operation of s 22. If this decision is allow to stand, s 22 is not the elephant in the room (heavy, weighty and very visible), but the converse, the sauropod 16 -large, slow moving, and despite these features invisible to the weary vision of small business. oppressive behaviour directly, inexorably, and indisputably feed into the loss occasioned on the plaintiff. In Allphones, four judges provided three different responses, and in the view of these authors, it is the judgement of the primary judge, Rares J that was correct.
The majority judgement of Goldberg and Jacobson JJ lacking an appreciation of the role s 22 is to play, with the other appellate judge Perram J (whilst coming to the same final result of Rares J) achieving that in a way which lacked the legal coherence of the primary judge.
Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd
Allphones is a franchisor. The respondent was one of its franchisees. It operated a store in the Westfield Shopping Centre in Eastgardens, Sydney. Unlike many other telecommunication franchises, Allphones was not tied to any particular carrier -for this reason, an Allphones franchisee was able to arrange a broader range of services than its competitors were. The relationship between the parties became dysfunctional, 24 with three aspects to the dispute:
• First, Hoy was entitled to receive from the franchisor 72.5% of any mobile telephone sales commission. As part of a promotion, Optus agreed that for every new phone activation, Allphones would receive a 'stretch' bonus payment of $150. Allphones did not regard this as something that would attract the 72.5% commission. Hoy Mobile disagreed.
• The second dispute concerned renewal of Optus phone contracts. Allphones would canvass Optus customers seeking to have them renew their telephone contracts. When his occurred, Optus would pay Allphones a bonus of $30 -none of which was passed on to Hoy. However, if the customer did renew, the commission of 72.5% continued to be paid to the franchisee. In so doing, Allphones would deduct an administration fee of $50 and a further delivery fee of $11 should there be a new handset. Hoy Mobile considered that these deductions should not have been made.
• The third area of dispute was a decision by Allphones to deduct fees owed to Hoy Mobile on the basis that Hoy Mobile would 'refresh' the look of the store. Again, Hoy considered that Allphones could not compel a change of store appearance and in any event, disputed the amount that Allphones had deducted.
Behind these, what objectively might be considered as minor financial discord between a franchisor and a franchisee, lay a dispute that was far more poisonous and which was in someway masked by the this context. Hoy Mobile had fraudulently unlocked mobile phones. This is a practise where a phone that was to be linked to a particular carrier was unlocked whereby the phone could then be attached to any particular telecommunications company. When this fraud came to the attention of Allphones, the franchise was terminated based on the contractual right contained within clause 9.3(viii) of the agreement that the franchisor could terminate if the franchisee engaged in fraudulent practices. The context in which this occurred however, was a judicial acceptance and acknowledgement that Allphones had acted deceitfully, 25 oppressively and engaged in overt bullying of the franchisee. 26 Some of these darker allegations consisted of a failure to address the substance of the correspondence provided by the franchisee, making threatening and unjustifiable demands as well as indicating that the franchisee had no tenure in that position.
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The decision of the primary judge, Rares J
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Rares J found as a matter of law that Allphones had no entitlement to deduct the stretch bonus with the franchisor being aware of this. For this reason, Allphones had repudiated the agreement. Similarly, Rares J considered that Allphones was not entitled to make the renewal deductions, and whilst it was entitled to charge for store refresh costs, the The Appeal (Goldberg and Jacobson JJ (majority); Perram J (minority))
On appeal the two crucial issues were:
• the accuracy of Rares J's conclusions regarding Allphones inability to be ready and willing to complete given their repudiation of their obligations under the franchise agreement right to terminate; and
• whether it was appropriate for the injunction to have been issued via s 243 for a breach of s 22.
The Majority
At the outset, the brief majority judgement of Goldberg, and Jacobson JJ should be distinguished from that of Perram J. In the authors' view the majority took, with respect, an incorrect approach to the issue at hand, as they regarded the termination issue and the s 22 issue as virtually the same. Therefore, once they decided that the express clause could be relied upon by Allphones, and that there was no causal nexus between authors are in disagreement with this limiting and narrow approach. The legislation is clear, the objectives easily understand. Section 22 establishes a norm of conduct for business, unconscionability is to be considered in all the circumstances. The status and circumstances involving the exercise of the express term and the s 22 issues are completely separate. While the former may be taken into account in assessing the latter, the conclusion regarding the express term, that it was operational, does not jettison the s 22 issue. To do this has not merely ameliorated the effect of s 22, but has allowed commercial behaviour that was uniformly accepted as oppressive and unconscionable to go unpunished, in essence no penalty for failure to comply with the statutorily demanded norm of conduct.
The Minority
Perram J also held that, with regard to the exercise of the contractual right to terminate, Allphones were not motivated by any extrinsic purpose or capriciousness to breach any duty of good faith. Therefore, the exercise of the right to terminate could not be regarded as unconscionable as there was no causal nexus between the allegedly unconscionable conduct by Allphones (the commissions) and the unrelated, and legitimate decision to terminate. Despite this, his Honour, correctly, it is asserted, treated the s 22 issue quite separately. Unlike the majority, Perram J did not disagree with Rares J conclusion that the termination was unconscionable, prevention possible by the issuing of an injunction under s 243. Perram J noted that Allphones' contention was that the unconscionable conduct identified by Rares J consisted of the wrongful retention of commission; there was no alternative argument that the conclusion that the termination was unconscionable should itself be set aside. 36 Therefore, there was no occasion to assess whether Allphones behaviour was unconscionable. Nevertheless, Perram J did go on to make the following statement:
I would not, however, wish necessarily to be seen as endorsing an approach to that question which downplays the fact that the termination of the agreement was not causally connected to the oppressive behaviour of Allphones . There may be 37 Perram J's views should be examined with regard to:
• The separate treatment of the termination issue and the unconscionability issue;
• Whether a causal nexus should restrain s 22;
• What impact this decision may have on the interpretation of s 22.
Separate treatment
First, it is suggested that the contractual issue should be kept quite separate from the operation of s 22. Section 22 promotes a norm of conduct with which corporations and persons must comply. Even though, in isolation, the exercise of the contractual right of termination was not exercised based on any impugned conduct on Allphones' part, this is just one of the many circumstances making up a consideration of unconscionable conduct in this particular context. It should not be permissible to use an isolated circumstance to, artificially it is suggested, prevent consideration of the wider context and operation of s 22.
Causal Link
Second, the fact that there was, fortuitously for Allphones, no causal link between the express right of termination and Hoy Mobile's fraud, should not automatically absolve
Allphones from its other instances of oppressive business conduct; the majority should not have jumped to a conclusion that the conduct was not unconscionable. The basis of the injunction under s 243 was much wider than the express right; indeed, in Rares J's view the two issues were quite separate, to the extent that given that decision on the termination point, Rares J need not have proceeded to consider s 22.
Section 22 requires an examination of all the circumstances and, if it was determined after consideration of those circumstances that the conduct was unconscionable remedies will follow. If a remedy is granted, because overall the conduct is unconscionable, the fact that the most appropriate remedy may override the operation of an express term that is unaffected by the otherwise unconscionable behaviour is simply a fact. In this case, although there was no a causal nexus between Allphones unconscionable conduct and its decision to terminate, there was conduct which, in all the circumstances, seemed to be regarded by Rares J as sufficiently unconscionable to justify the grant of the injunction.
Although it is not clear on the face of the case, the only way that Rares J could have reached this decision is by assessing the overall conduct, including a consideration of the existence of the express term and Hoy Mobile's fraudulent conduct, and determining it was unconscionable. Only then would the remedy be available.
Perram J's concern was that there must be a logical connection between the conduct and the remedy sought -otherwise s 22 would cease to be a provision establishing a norm of conduct, but a remedial conclusion in itself, the bedfellow of s 243 would presumably merely be a procedural adjunct. But, it is suggested, that Rares J did find that connection.
There was a logical ligation between the instances of Allphones (in particular the nonpayment of commissions and the bullying and uncooperative behaviour) and a finding of unconscionable conduct. Although references were made to the termination being unconscionable, it is suggested that this was the remedial conclusion (i.e. the most appropriate remedy on the facts) which could only be available reaching a conclusion that in all the circumstances, Allphones conduct, including the existence of the express clause, the lack of a causal nexus on that issue and a consideration of Hoy's fraud, was unconscionable. 38 It seems even if the express clause had been held by Rares J to be valid, His Honour could have continued with the discussion of s 22 anyway. The remedial conclusion is only justifiable by breach of the norm, which is done by the constellation of circumstances. Rares J's judgment does not undermine the requirement for a causal nexus.
Effect on interpretation of s 22
Unfortunately, the application for special leave to the High Court on this issue has been refused. 39 The special leave application was based on the termination and unconscionability issues. In relation to the termination, French CJ and Gummow J were of the view that the issue was one of construction of the particular clause and it was unnecessary to revisit the 'ready and willingness' issues examined at first instance and on appeal.
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The unconscionability point is intriguing. Counsel for Hoy Mobile stressed the difficulties in which would be experienced in the interpretation of s 22 if the decision of the majority of the Full Court stood. 41 Indeed, this contention caused French CJ to query if the majority's approach had the effect of limiting s 22 to equitable notions. 42 It was contended that the majority's interpretation would limit s 22 to the common law and, if this were correct, there would be no more work for s 22 to do in respect of termination.
Special leave was not granted but it is worthwhile noting French CJ's comments in full:
The Full Court also decided, by majority, that the exercise by Allphones of its contractual right to terminate could not constitute conduct that was 38 We submit that the approach described at (2009) 178 FCR 57, [86] is the correct one, namely, that one looks at the conduct in relation to a termination to see whether the termination would be unconscionable. Then in terms of the causation element, one can say that it would be likely to produce loss or damage if the party unconscionably seeking to exercise a right of termination were to go ahead and do it and that livens the 87 remedy. That, we submit, is the correct approach. J. This suggests that the upholding of the express right of termination will not jettison the s 22 considerations. But, unfortunately, more cases will be required to achieve an ultimate answer. In some respects, this refusal by French CJ (along with Gummow J) to grant special leave was somewhat surprising. French J (as he then was) in the first instance decision in Berbatis 43 promoting an expansive view of unconscionability with the possibility that this doctrine would unify various equitable tenets such as estoppel, unjust enrichment, economic duress and unilateral mistake, 44 with the recognition that is parameters are "normative rather than logical". 45 Given this we may have thought that as the Chief Justice in the High Court, the opportunity presented by Allphones to reverse the restrictive constraints placed on the doctrine by the then majority of the High Court in demands of the curial discretion that consideration be given to the behaviour of the parties throughout the contractual process. The direction to the Bench to engage in social engineering 49 is clear, explicit and should be heeded, concern as to uncertainty and imprecision swept aside in a search for not merely truth, but fairness.
Conclusion
The then Justice French, writing extra judicially, described common law causes of action when compared with misleading and deceptive conduct as a "slow-growing sauropod." Jurassic relative, the common law doctrine of unconscionability. However, the decision the subject of focus in this paper, unless reversed, may well alter that thinking. Indeed, it may be suggested that in the decade of s 22, it has become that sauropod, slowly moving, rarely seen and glacially moving towards its extinction. institutions. The intent of Parliament was clear, the wording explicit, the conclusion reached by Rares J appropriate. Allphones engaged in unconscionable conduct -to respond that this was causally distinct from the power of termination and was independent of the oppressive conduct is to dimidiate behaviour in a way that has no commercial or practical reality. The relationship of franchisor and franchisee had become dysfunctional and to segregate some conduct into behaviour that was dishonest, oppressive and bullying, but to equally suggest that the power of termination was a legitimate exercise of contractual power serves only to undermine the stated intent to the
Competition and Consumer Act 2010, and the reasons behind s 22 of the Australian
Consumer Law. Whatever may the economic costs of intervention, the less quantifiable notion of underlying fairness is no less important. Unconscionability is fast becoming the sauropod -if the common law is unable to deliver Parliament's aims, then Parliament must act.
